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This chapter elaborates on the migration flows from the Balkans into Turkey, taking 
a historical approach. In doing so, it focuses particularly on migration from that part 
of the Balkans consisting of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and former Yugo-
slavia1 within four historical periods. The first period looks at emigration from these 
countries into Turkey during the late Ottoman period, beginning with the decline 
of the Empire. The second period describes the waves of Balkan migration into the 
newborn republic of Turkey until the end of World War II. Over this period there 
were two concerns of the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic: (i) the matter of 
the declining population of the country from 16 million in 1914 to around 13 mil-
lion in the 1920s (Courbage and Fargues 1998, p. 128); and (ii) the issue of creating 
a homogenous sense of national identity in an otherwise ethnically and culturally 
diverse country. This latter concern was very much driven by a deep-seated belief 
that the Ottoman Empire had collapsed because of its multiethnic and multicultural 
nature (Ahmad 1993). Thus, the immigration policy pursued during this period was 
to encourage and accept immigrants who could speak the Turkish language and 
had an affiliation with Turkishness. In practice, however, those who belonged to 
a Sunni-Hanafi religious background were given preferential entry (Kirişci 1996, 
2000).2 Accordingly, the groups that were supposedly easier to melt into a Turkish 
identity were mostly Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars.
1 Owing to the fact that Yugoslavia did not exist as a country before 1929, it is taken here as a 
region at least until this date.
2 The selection criteria for the period were not clear while conceptions of Turkishness were very 
vague.
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The third period—between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold 
War—witnesses a transformation of Turkey’s above-mentioned immigration policy 
into one that discouraged immigration on the grounds that Turkey’s population had 
grown sufficiently and that land to distribute to immigrants had become scarce. 
Nevertheless, immigration during this period did continue with the migration of 
ethnic Turks and Muslims, in particular, with flows from Greece and Bulgaria; the 
latest large wave occurred in 1989 when more than 300,000 Turks and Pomaks were 
expelled from Bulgaria.
The fourth period—since the end of the Cold War—expands on both change and 
continuity in the nature of migration to Turkey from the Balkan countries under 
consideration. For example, while migration from Yugoslavia into Turkey during 
the break-up of the country did resemble the migration wave from Bulgaria in 1989, 
the return migration from Turkey to Bulgaria (caused by regime change in the latter 
in 1990 as the Cold War came to an end) was a rather new phenomenon. This trend 
of return was recently reinforced by Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, when more and 
more of these migrants—that is, Turkish- and Bulgarian-speaking Muslims—re-
claimed Bulgarian citizenship3 in order to obtain the right to travel to Bulgaria and 
other EU countries without a visa. At the same time, the nature of immigration from 
the Balkans into Turkey is changing from permanent to temporary with increasing 
two-way transit irregular migration. To illustrate, Parla (this volume) wonderfully 
describes how Turkish-speaking migrants from Bulgaria have transformed from a 
group of migrants who were historically the most privileged among migrant groups 
in Turkey to a group whose legal status has so shifted over the last two decades to 
become one of systematic irregularity.
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, more than 1.6 million 
immigrants from the Balkans have come and settled in Turkey; we argue that over 
time there have been changing patterns in these migration flows and in the migrants’ 
characteristics. These changes reflect the dramatic transformations in the region 
throughout the twentieth century—initially through nation- and state-building, and 
more recently via globalization processes that have altered social, economic, and 
political structures in the Balkans.
There is a methodological concern that should be noted here. This study largely 
benefits from the analysis of secondary data and literature, which should not be 
seen as a deficiency for several reasons: (i) no single comprehensive study has been 
conducted on the migration flows from the Balkans to Turkey; (ii) existing studies 
are sketchy and limited; and (iii) a study that is broad enough to cover the issue 
thematically and historically is lacking. Thus, this study tries to go beyond what has 
been said before, as it presents a cross-temporal and cross-country analysis.
3 Such people retain their Turkish citizenship as both countries allow dual nationality.
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5.1  The Late Ottoman Period
Crying, while crying
With the ballad of coy Bodin from Tuna
With the anthem of Algeria from Africa
With the elegy of ‘O veterans!’ from the seas of Arabia
We migrated to the land of Anatolia…4
The Ottomans’ reign in the Balkans lasted almost 400 years until the late nineteenth 
century when there was an emerging Russian influence in the region. Although the 
signs of decline had become evident much earlier with the Serbian (1804–1835) 
and Greek (1814–1827) revolutions, it was really with the loss of the 1877–1878 
Russian-Ottoman War that the Ottoman Empire began to lose its importance in the 
region. Stola (1992, p. 328) states:
The Ottoman Empire was the first of the multinational empires in Central Europe to decline 
and retreat. Turkish reprisals for rebellions and mutual hostility between Muslims and 
Christians generated thousands of refugees, who moved between Turkey and its former 
provinces, especially after the territorial changes caused by the Russian-Turkish war of 
1877…. Up to 1912… the inflow of Muslim refugees apparently doubled the population 
of Constantinople.
As Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia established their 
nation states and embarked on their policies of creating homogeneous ethnic societ-
ies, Turks and non-Turkish Muslims (e.g., Cretan Muslims, Pomaks, Roma, Tor-
besh, and Vallahades) of the region began to search for new homes in the Anatolian 
peninsula (Duman 2008, p. 23; İpek 1999, pp. 14–21; Todorova 1997, pp. 348–
349). This was a rather new migration flow: instead of the historical East to West 
migrations of the Turks to the newly conquered Ottoman territories, this migration 
was from the West to the East—this time from the lost lands to the safe haven 
of Anatolia. It was in this context that the Greek revolt was accompanied by the 
slaughter of many Muslims and the flight of many others (McCarthy 1995). Most 
of these refugees went just northwards to a part of the Balkans still under Ottoman 
control rather than to what is now Turkey. Many of them, however, undoubtedly 
migrated to Turkey at a later stage.
It is important to underline that in this late Ottoman period, religion rather than 
language was the defining characteristic of these flows. Even in the succeeding 
early Republican period, immigration was defined more in religious than in linguis-
tic terms—that is, it was enough to be a Muslim to settle in the country. Eventually, 
the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was also drawn up with this rationale, where reli-
gious rather than ethnic minorities were the main concern. Thus, it is rather hard to 
distinguish between these categories for those periods where the words ‘Turk’ and 
‘Muslim’ were used interchangeably. As explained by İçduygu et al. (2007, p. 359):
4 Translated by the authors from the Turkish original: ‘…Biz, Tuna’dan ‘Nazlı Bodin’ türküsüyle, 
Afrika’dan ‘Cezayir Marşı’ ile, Arabistan denizlerinden ‘Ey Gaziler’ mersiyesi ile ağlaya ağlaya, 
Anadolu toprağına göçettik…’ (Atay 1970, p. 86).
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Despite the use of the category of ‘Turk’ as a building block of the nation-state, what this 
word referred to was initially ambiguous and this ambiguity was to persist, with the defini-
tion and content of ‘Turk’ undergoing changes in different eras, subject to the influence of 
events and developments (Kadıoğlu 1998). ‘Turk’ was used to refer sometimes to an ethnic 
group originating in Central Asia, sometimes to a legal status of citizenship on the basis of 
identity cards and passports and sometimes to individuals sharing a common culture, i.e. 
Turkish culture (Deringil 2000). As to the religion of the ‘Turk’, Islam was frequently used 
to define Turks, the Turkish nation and Turkish culture. In other words, Islam provided a 
reference point in the definition of the ordinary Turk (Kirişci 2000; Meeker 2002; Özbudun 
1998; Özdoğan 1996). As a result, the inclusion of non-Muslims has been problematic in 
the normative definition of ‘Turk’. (Keyman and İçduygu 1998)
There were two substantial migration waves from the Balkans during the late Otto-
man period predating the founding of the Turkish nation state. The first consisted 
of migrations that occurred during the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, which 
marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Empire and caused more than a mil-
lion Muslims to be uprooted (Kocacık and Yalçın 2008; McCarthy 1995); the sec-
ond wave was during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, during which approximately 
200,000 Turks died and another 440,000 migrated from Thrace and Macedonia in 
the aftermath of the wars until the Republic was founded (Eren 1993, pp. 292–293). 
Hence, both events caused Muslims’ retreat from the lost territories of the Ottoman 
Empire.
Especially following the latter, the admittance and settlement of the population 
dislocated from the lost territories became one of the major issues that the ruling 
Unity and Progress Party ( İttihak ve Terakki hereafter) of the Young Turks had to 
tackle (Dündar 2001, p. 121). The most important tool that İttihak ve Terakki used 
to deal with the issue was the signing of population exchange agreements. With the 
changes in the borders and the emergence of new nation states in the aftermath of 
the Balkan Wars, the newborn states began to pursue ways to create a homogeneous 
population within their new borders. Thus, the population exchange agreements 
were regarded as the most legitimate way of achieving this goal. Within this frame-
work, the first voluntary population exchange agreement was part of the Treaty of 
Constantinople (also known as the Treaty of Istanbul), which was a treaty between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria signed on 29 September 1913 
in the Ottoman capital Istanbul after the Second Balkan War (Babuş 2006; Dündar 
2001, p. 60). The main terms of the treaty were: (i) Bulgaria acknowledged Ottoman 
gains of Edirne, Kırklareli, and Demotika (Didimoteicho) and the surrounding ter-
ritory; (ii) the Ottoman Empire ceded the port of Dedeagach (now Alexandroupoli) 
to Bulgaria; (iii) the exchange of lands was to be completed within 10 days; (iv) the 
armies on the border would be demobilized within 3 weeks; (v) prisoners of war 
from both sides would be released; (vi) both political and economic ties between the 
two countries would be re-established; and (vii) the voluntary exchange of popula-
tion would be organized within the next 4 years (see Anderson and Hershey 1918). It 
was at this point that 47,000 Bulgarians in Ottoman Thrace left their homes in return 
for 49,000 Turks being accepted into Turkey from Bulgaria (Psomiades 1968, p. 60).
In fact, most of the population was already subject to forced displacement dur-
ing the wars, and the agreements were only relevant for smaller populations (Tekeli 
1990, p. 60). Beyond population exchange, the agreements also stipulated exchange 
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of properties, protection of property rights, and guarantee of the rights of minority 
populations left behind. However, a year after the Balkan Wars—with the advent of 
World War I—many such agreements were nullified and the population exchange 
process was halted.
A second tool that İttihak ve Terakki utilized to manage the problem of displaced 
populations was the combination of conscription and resettlement strategies, which 
first targeted the resettlement of migrants from the Balkans to nearby border regions 
in Thrace, where the cities and towns were mostly inhabited by non-Muslim popu-
lations (Ağanoğlu 2001, p. 110). Those newly arrived Muslim migrants were not 
only settled in these regions, but male immigrants were also conscripted in the same 
regions. Consequently, this strategy served both external and internal security pur-
poses. Looking at the records of the Ministry of Interior of the time, Dündar (2001, 
pp. 71–72) argues that the combination of resettlement and conscription was an 
essential mode of ‘Turkification’ of those areas with insufficient Turk and Muslim 
populations within the Empire (see also Ulukan 2008).
The censuses were the third policy that İttihak ve Terakki employed as a means 
of controlling population movements. Realizing that it was important to know the 
number of outgoing non-Muslim populations in order to be able to settle the in-
coming Muslim populations in an efficient manner—that is, making the population 
within the borders as Turkish and Muslim as possible—unofficial censuses were 
conducted and Anatolia’s ethnic and religious distribution was figured out. Popula-
tion movements were closely scrutinized and ethnographic maps of the Ottoman 
state were drawn (Dündar 2001, pp. 71–72; Ulukan 2008).
All in all, the policies pursued by İttihak ve Terakki, motivated by Turkish na-
tionalism, designated the ethnic and religious distribution of the contemporary Ana-
tolian peninsula. Migration and settlement policies largely focused on creating a 
homogeneous Turkish and Muslim community—rather than economic interests, 
human conditions, and/or utilization of unused land for production.
Within this context, Albanians are an illustrative case. Until the independence 
of Albania was proclaimed in 1912, voluntary migration and the devşirme5 practice 
had caused an emergence of Albanian presence in the Ottoman army and adminis-
tration in Istanbul (De Rapper 2000). Migration of Albanians to Istanbul continued 
even during the early years of the Albanian state, as the government could exercise 
its authority in only a small part of the territory—the rest being occupied by the 
Greeks in the south, and by the Serbs and Montenegrins in the north. Violence and 
insecurity caused many Albanians to flee. Istanbul was a major destination for two 
reasons. First, many Albanians already had relatives or friends in the Ottoman capi-
tal and could count on the support of established networks. Second, rural Albanian 
populations were mostly Muslim. They did not have a developed Albanian national 
consciousness and were accustomed to being referred to as ‘Turks’ (a religious cat-
egory rather than a national or ethnic community); thus, the Ottoman Empire and 
5 It is translated as ‘collection of children’, ‘child-gathering’, or ‘blood tax’ in different Balkan 
languages. This was the practice by which the Ottoman Empire recruited boys, forcibly, from 
Christian families, who were selected by skilled scouts to be trained and enrolled in one of the four 
imperial institutions—the Palace, the Scribes, the Religious, and the Military.
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Turkey seemed a natural destination (De Rapper 2000). In this case, the definition 
of the category ‘Albanian’ had different meanings: on one hand, albeit to a lesser 
extent, it referred to those groups of people with Albanian nationality (ibid.). On 
the other hand, it referred to those ex-Yugoslavs in Albania and Greece who were 
recognized as of Albanian origin based on personal experience or verified familial 
ties (ibid.). Thus, a subjective definition of Albanian is being utilized that reposes 
on the identification of the people to the ‘Albanian’ category, and that does not 
take into consideration objective criteria like nationality (citizenship), language, or 
birthplace. As seen in the next section, especially for Albanian Muslims from west-
ern Greek Macedonia, such a subjective categorization proves to be problematic; 
however, there is no better classification owing to a lack of accurate data on the 
characteristics of the people in the region (i.e., their origins).
5.2  The Early Years of the Republic
We want a numerous population, a satiated population, a happy and affluent population. 
Against the history that left Anatolia empty, poor, old and ruined, we have a grudge that 
is growing every day. The energy of creating a numerous, happy and affluent Anatolia is 
coming from the force of this growing grudge. Today’s Anatolia that we took over from 
the past government is in its most desolate and neglected position in its history. If we do 
not at least double the number of this population of fourteen million, whose entire civil 
capabilities have been unnoticed, whose needs are diminished, and who is almost ignored 
of civilization, in a rather short period of time, we would jeopardize our survival against 
the populous and technologically developed nations of the future. Under its perished nature 
that seems to be desolate, Anatolia is an untouched country that hides all the conditions of a 
life in heaven. This country is waiting for the Turkish nation to get crowded and numerous. 
Our target is a technologically developed, satiated, happy and numerous Turkish nation 
(Aydemir 1932, p. 35).
The founding fathers of the Turkish Republic were troubled by the recently reduced 
population of the country. The decrease was not only the result of the wars, but 
also of the towering death rates owing to general lack of health care, and to ill-
nesses such as malaria, syphilis, trachoma, typhoid, and dysentery (Duman 2008, 
p. 24). Within this context, the founding fathers sought the means of generating a 
homogeneous sense of national identity in a fragile country that was otherwise eth-
nically and culturally diverse (İçduygu and Kirişci 2009). Thus, people who were 
either Muslim Turkish speakers or could easily melt into a Turkish identity (such as 
Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars from the Balkans) were given exclusive 
priority and accepted as immigrants into the country (Kirişci 1996, 2000).6 From 
6 The immigration of Turks from Western Thrace was an exception. According to Article 2 of the 
Exchange Agreement between Greece and Turkey, which comprised 19 articles and which was 
appended to the Lausanne Treaty, the Greeks in Istanbul and the Turks in Western Thrace were to 
be excluded from exchange. For strategic reasons, Turkish governments did not view immigration 
from Western Thrace positively. For a detailed elaboration, see Öksüz (2004).
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the foundation of the Republic in 1923 until 1997, more than 1.6 million people 
migrated to Turkey, settled in the country, and were successfully assimilated.
The demographic conditions that the Republic of Turkey inherited from the Ot-
toman Empire are known to be the result of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 
and the subsequent wars, which caused the uprooting of many Muslim migrants 
from various ethnic backgrounds (Ulukan 2008, p. 47). During the years of the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many immigration flows took place—mainly 
from the Balkans, the Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Hatay,7 the Middle East, and the So-
viet Union (Çağaptay 2002; Ulukan 2008). The immigration of the Muslims caused 
drastic demographic changes in the proportion of non-Muslims within the popula-
tion: before World War I, while one in every five persons was a non-Muslim within 
the geography consisting of the territories of the Republic, after the war this ratio 
had decreased to one in every 40 persons (Keyder 1989, p. 67; Table 5.1).
With such changing demographic conditions, the issues of settling the newcom-
ers as well as homogenizing the new population became important items on the 
agenda of the founding fathers. Accordingly, the 1926 Law of Settlement—the first 
significant official text governing voluntary immigration—charged the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs with the tasks of admitting the immigrants and refugees to the coun-
try, and of determining their regions of settlement as well as stating who could not 
be admitted as an immigrant or refugee (Ulker 2007). Thus, based on Article 2 of 
the law:
People who do not belong to Turkish culture, who are infected with syphilis, who are sub-
ject to leprosy and their families, who are imprisoned because of committing murder except 
political and military reasons, anarchists, spies, gypsies, or who are exiled outside of the 
country cannot be admitted.
7 Hatay was part of Aleppo in Ottoman Syria. Following World War I, Hatay (then known as Al-
exandretta) was under the French Mandate of Syria. Unlike other regions historically belonging to 
Syrian provinces, Alexandretta was considered as Syrian territory in the Treaty of Lausanne, but it 
was granted a special autonomous status because it contained a large Turkish minority. Concomi-
tant to a series of border disputes with France-mandated Syria, in 1937 an agreement was signed 
with France recognizing Alexandretta as an independent state, and in 1939 following a referendum 
this state, called the Republic of Hatay, was annexed to Turkey as the 63rd Turkish province.
Table 5.1  The Muslim and non-Muslim population in Turkey, 1914–2005 (in thousands). (Source: 
İçduygu and Kirişci 2009, p. 2)
Year 1914 1927 1945 1965 1990 2005
Muslims 12,941 1329 18,511 31,139 5686 71,997
Greeks 1549 110 104 76 8 3
Armenians 1204 77 60 64 67 50
Jews 128 82 77 38 29 27
Others 176 71 38 74 50 45
TOTAL 15,997 13,630 18,790 31,391 57,005 72,122
Percentage of non-Muslims 19.1 2.5 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.2
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Thus, this law linked the admission of immigrants and refugees to the condition of 
belonging to Turkish culture. However, who was to be considered within this cat-
egory was not specified in the law. Indeed, beside the Muslim-Turk population liv-
ing outside the borders of the Republic, this category also referred to the non-Turk, 
but Muslim, ethnic and linguistic groups, especially from the Balkans. Here culture 
very much refers to being Muslim, which was a deviation from Ziya Gökalp’s idea 
of Turkish culture being based on religion, language, a common history and values. 
Thus, with this law, while the conditions of resettlement of Ottoman Muslims were 
alleviated, non-Muslim Ottoman subjects’ resettlement to the country was outlawed 
(Çağaptay 2002, p. 225; Ulukan 2008, p. 50). This importance given to religion was 
in contradiction to the secular foundations of the Republic, a major paradox of the 
initial years:
While seeming to reject their Ottoman and Islamic heritage, the new regime (Republic) 
still continued to respect the common historical heritage with those non-Turkish groups 
[of Bosnians, Albanians, and Macedonians]. Those groups were placed within the Muslim 
millet8 in the Ottoman Empire, and, it might be argued, there is a reflection of that millet 
system in the Turkish Republic in its recognition of the groups that previously were parts of 
the Muslim millet as Turks (İçduygu et al. 1999, pp. 195–196)
As time passed, the 1926 Law of Settlement on population problems proved to 
be inefficient, and it was decided that a more general settlement law was needed. 
Thus, the 1934 Law of Settlement came to be the most comprehensive law of its 
time—not merely regulating only migration or settlement, but really a tool for creat-
ing a homogeneous national identity of the ‘new Turk’ (Kirişci 2000, p. 4). The law 
aimed at increasing the population and production capacity, attaching the refugees 
and immigrants to the national culture, settling nomadic populations and provid-
ing them with land, teaching everybody the Turkish language and their citizen-
ship rights, and thus, creating a nation to protect the unity and security of the state 
(Babuş 2006, p. 298; Ulukan 2008, p. 51).
According to the 1934 Law of Settlement, only those of Turkish descent and 
culture would be accepted as immigrants in Turkey. In practice, this excluded non-
Muslim Turks (like the Gagauz Turks), but included non-Turkish Muslims (like 
Pomaks, Tatars, and Bosnians). However, the law did not define who was of Turkish 
descent and culture, but left the matter to be determined by the Council of Ministers. 
Looking at Table 5.2, it can easily be observed that the people from the Balkans—
that is, from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia—were the largest group 
who migrated to Turkey.
Thus, immigration from the Balkans comprised an important part of the im-
migration history of the Republic. Some of these movements were a result of 
population exchange agreements signed after the War of Independence. For ex-
ample, the agreement on the 1923 Turkish-Greek population exchange, which was 
signed in Lausanne, was an important historical document. Nearly 900,000 out of 
8 Millet is a term for the confessional communities in the Ottoman Empire, referring to the separate 
legal courts pertaining to ‘personal law’ under which communities (Muslim Sharia, Christian Can-
on law, and Jewish Halakha law abiding) were allowed to rule themselves under their own system.
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approximately 1.5 million Anatolian Greeks had already left the country following 
the Greek retreat in the Turkish War of Independence, and the population exchange 
agreement provided legitimacy for that de facto emigration (Psomiades 1968, 
p. 120). The agreement set out some further emigration: during the agreement’s im-
plementation, 150,000 Greeks left behind in Anatolia were sent to Greece in return 
for 360,000 Muslims accepted into Turkey from Greece (Geray 1970, p. 10). The 
number included both ethnic Turks and the Albanian Muslims from western Greek 
Macedonia who were classified as Turks at the time of the exchange of populations 
and were forced to leave their villages for Turkey in 1924 (De Rapper 2000).9
There is also an asymmetry that is worth noting regarding the agreement—
namely, that while most of the Greek migrations were forced by circumstances, a 
very large proportion of the Muslims going to Turkey were obliged to do so solely 
by virtue of the agreement. It not only drastically changed the two countries’ de-
mographic characteristics, but also affected their economic activities. To illustrate, 
with the emigration of the Greek population—historically known as the entrepre-
neur class of the Ottoman Empire—the newborn Turkey became deficient in trade 
and industry capacity; at the same time, it gained in agricultural production capacity 
as the newcomers brought with them important know-how concerning agriculture.
Another state-regulated—not compulsory, merely regulated—agreement was 
one signed with Bulgaria. The 1925 Treaty of Amity, together with a settlement 
contract, set rules for protection of Turkish and Bulgarian minorities in Bulgaria and 
Turkey, respectively, as well as provisions on citizenship and voluntary resettlement 
(Değerli 2009). According to the Treaty, Turkish and Bulgarian citizens could freely 
move and settle in each other’s countries, provided that they had the religion of 
the country of settlement. From 1923 until 1939, almost 200,000 people emigrated 
from Bulgaria to Turkey, a number that dropped considerably in the following pe-
riod (see Table 5.2).
There were also migrations from Romania. The Romanian government’s land 
confiscation policies, imposed co-habitation with the Vlachs, lack of security for 
minorities, and heightening economic problems led the ethnic Turks to migrate to 
Turkey, which had a welcoming immigration strategy at the time. The immigration 
9 The exodus of the Muslims from Greece began much earlier; for details, see Baldwin-Edwards 
and Apostolatou (2008).
Table 5.2  Migrations to Turkey by region of origin and time period (1923–1997). (Source: 
İçduygu and Kirişci 2009, p. 10)
Region of origin 1923–1939 1940–1945 1946–1997 TOTAL
Bulgaria 198,688 15,744 603,726 818,158
Greece 384,000 NA 25,889 409,889
Romania 117,095 4201 1266 122,562
Yugoslavia 115,427 1671 188,600 428,260
Others 7998 1005 11,509 20,512
TOTAL 823,208 22,621 83,099 1,676,819
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of Turks from Romania can be analysed in two stages during the early Republi-
can period: (i) the 1923–1933 migrations, which were lesser in scale and could be 
characterized as immigrations of small groups of voluntary migrants; and (ii) the 
1934–1938 migrations, which were larger flows—of a less voluntary nature—who 
were received as migrants-to-be-settled by the Turkish state (Duman 2008). This 
latter interwar period was characterized by the emergence of states where authori-
tarian regimes were introduced in Central Europe, and when anti-Semitism became 
an important additional factor, increasing Jewish emigration from Romania (Stola 
1992). It was also the time when ethnic purification, rather than assimilation or 
integration of ethnic minorities, was becoming a dominant idea in Romania (Achim 
2001). Accordingly,
Romanian Turks were to benefit from ‘a gradual transfer operated by the Turkish govern-
ment’, a reference to a convention signed by the Romanian and Turkish governments on 
September 4, 1936 that mentioned the possibility of a voluntary emigration of the Moslem 
Turkish minority living in Dobrudja. The convention had remained in effect, and by April 
15, 1941 70,000 ethnic Turks had already left. (Achim 2001, p. 605)
There were also migration flows of Turks from Yugoslavia10 during this early Re-
publican period, which were a result of the economic, political, social, and cultural 
conditions. The world economic crisis of 1929 and the Agricultural Reform Act of 
1931 (along with confiscation of the properties of religious and charitable founda-
tions) affected the Turks as the segment of society that owned the largest agricultur-
al lands and whose income had been dependent on agricultural productivity (Öksüz 
and Köksal 2004). ‘The negative effects of the land reform and the confiscation of 
the properties of the religious and charitable foundations can be seen in a complaint 
made by the Turks and Albanians to the League of the Nations in 1930’ (Öksüz and 
Köksal 2004, p. 150).
While Turks of Yugoslavia were subjected to political pressures—which made 
it impossible for them to unite and take action—socially and culturally, they were 
also devoid of minority rights to vote and for education in their own language. 
Moreover, there were massacres against the Turks in various parts of Yugoslavia11 
at the time (Öksüz and Köksal 2004). Thus, based on the official statistics, between 
1923 and 1949, some 5894 people within 1449 households emigrated from Yugo-
slavia to Turkey as permanent immigrants, that is, they were settled by the state, 
and 111,318 people within 27,030 households came to Turkey as free immigrants, 
that is, they arrived voluntarily without any state regulation of settlement (Öksüz 
and Köksal 2004).
It is important to note that in this period, while the importance of religion com-
pared to language was declining in terms of defining the characteristic of these 
10 The usage of the name ‘Yugoslavia’ needs careful exposition of the different territorial names 
and realities of different periods. Here it refers to the country called Yugoslavia that existed be-
tween 1929 and 1946. That country is not the same one as the Federal People’s Republic of Yu-
goslavia in 1946.
11 Unfortunately, there are no data providing specific information on how many people came from 
different regions, such as Macedonia.
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flows, immigration was still considered more in terms of religion than nationality. 
The Albanian case was illustrative in this sense, as many Albanians migrated to 
Turkey between 1918 and 1941, during the colonization of Kosovo by Yugoslavia 
(De Rapper 2000). Even during this incident, the categories of Albanian, Turk, and 
Muslim were interchangeable. As described by de Rapper (2000):12
Especially after 1928, measures were taken to encourage the emigration of Albanians 
to Albania and to Turkey. An agreement was signed in July 1938 between the Yugoslav 
and Turkish governments, the latter agreeing to take up to 200,000 Albanians, Turks and 
Muslims from Kosovo and Macedonia (40,000 families). This agreement however was 
not ratified by the Turkish Parliament and the funds were never released to implement the 
movement and settlement of refugees in sparsely populated Anatolia. Between 1929 and 
1941, however, Yugoslavia strove to organize the departure of Albanians on the basis of 
international agreements, and managed to provoke a wave of departures to Albania and 
Turkey.
5.3  The Cold War Years
Edirne13 resembles the Armageddon
People hugging each other, filled with tears, bewildered
Uprooted and forced to leave
They have a wry look around
Blow thy demented blow, blow
You are not blowing, where are you?
Where on the Earth are you?
Now there you are
A hurricane, a tornado, a thunderstorm
As you are not in Bulgaria
Deliorman is enclosed in gloominess
Birds not singing, leaves not moving
Flowers cut off from the stems
People not smiling
Blow thy demented blow, blow
Tell freely about us, the oppression
To the entire world… (Yalınkılıç 1991, p. 19)14
During the period following World War II until the 1990s, there were two kinds 
of international migration on the Balkan peninsula—ethnic and labour migrations 
(Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004). Only the former is applicable to the context of Balkan 
migration to Turkey, which was very political in nature. After the establishment 
of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, those parts of the population who 
were not pleased about the passage to communism, especially among the Turks and 
12 Quotation translated by the authors.
13 The western province of Turkey, which is a point of entry from the Balkans. Also known as 
‘Ludogorie’ in Bulgarian, it is a region that was largely inhabited by Turks.
14 Quotation translated by the authors.
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the Muslims (i.e., Albanians, Bosnians, etc.), began to migrate to Turkey after rela-
tions were reinstated by the two countries.
These movements can be categorized as refugee movements, but in a rather dif-
ferent sense than the conventional refugees who are subject to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Kirişci (1996, 1991) defines the Turkish refugee system using three 
categories: The first category is that of convention refugees, who are individuals 
seeking asylum from European countries and who are subject to the rules and con-
ditions of the Geneva Convention. The second type is non-convention refugees and 
consists of those coming from non-European countries, such as Iraq, Iran, and Af-
ghanistan. Owing to the geographical limitation that Turkey holds to the Geneva 
Convention—that is, only asylum seekers from the West can settle in Turkey as 
refugees—these people are usually resettled in a third country. The third category 
is that of national refugees, which refers to immigrants of Turkish origin mainly 
coming from the Balkans, including non-Turkish speaking Muslims, ethnic groups 
associated with the Turks from Central Asia and the former Soviet Union, and Mus-
lims associated with the Ottoman Empire, such as Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Po-
maks, and Tatars. Thus, the movements mentioned above fit into this third category 
of so-called national refugees.
Between 1954 and 1990, a total of 185,000 people migrated to Turkey, includ-
ing—besides those of Turkish origin—many Muslim Albanians and Muslims from 
Bosnia and Sandjak, who declared themselves to be Turks in order to be able to 
migrate to Turkey (Kirişci 1995). By 1950, there were 16,079 Albanian speaking, 
24,013 Bosnian speaking, and 1605 Serbian speaking Yugoslav migrants in Turkey 
(Dündar 1999).
The migration flows from Bulgaria to Turkey during the Cold War years can be 
divided into three stages: (i) 1950–1953, the period shortly after the declaration of 
a communist state and collectivization of land in Bulgaria when almost 250,000 
people of Turkish origin15 were granted permission to emigrate from Bulgaria; (ii) 
following the 1968 family reunification agreements between Turkey and Bulgaria, 
when more than 95,000 Turks obtained the right to emigrate to Turkey; (iii) in 1989, 
when the Bulgarian state’s assimilation campaign against the Turks incited new 
migration flows into Turkey. It is important to note that especially for the first two 
periods, it is rather hard to provide exact figures for the migration flows, as the 
sources on both sides are biased, either reducing or increasing the numbers based 
on their own ideological interests (Parla 2003, 2006).
The migration flows of the 1950–1953 period were a result of the policies of the 
newly-formed communist state, which decided to unify the education system, re-
strict religious practices, and centralize agricultural production. All of these, besides 
affecting other Bulgarian citizens, also concerned the Turkish community, which 
made up almost 10 % of the population in Bulgaria at the time and had enjoyed 
considerable freedom both in practising their religion, language, and traditions, and 
in running their own schools (Beltan 2006, p. 25). As a result of these policies, 
15 The number included Pomaks who were considered to be of Turkish origin through their Islamic 
orientation, but there are no data differentiating this group from the larger Turkish minority.
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154,393 Bulgarian Turks migrated to Turkey between January 1950 and November 
1951. They were accepted by the Turkish as settled immigrants and received finan-
cial support (Beltan 2006, p. 25).
Estimates of the number of Turks migrating from Bulgaria to Turkey after the 
1968 agreements (which aimed at uniting separated families), vary from 50,000 to 
130,000 depending on the source (Parla 2003, 2006). Parla (2003, p. 562) argues 
that these migrations ‘depended not only on the political regimes in Bulgaria, but 
also on those in Turkey, with the latter’s attitudes towards its “racial kin” ( soydas) 
ranging from welcoming to indifference to reluctant acceptance, contingent on the 
political and economic climate’.
The third stage of migration flows from Bulgaria to Turkey was during the so-
called Revival Process in Bulgaria, which was an assimilation campaign that began 
in 1984 with bans on wearing traditional Turkish dress and speaking Turkish in 
public places. It continued with a name-changing campaign targeting Turks. As a 
result of this assimilation campaign, almost 350,000 Bulgarian Turks16 migrated to 
Turkey between June 1989 and August 1989 (Kirişci 1995, pp. 63–66).
The Revival Process was implemented not only in Bulgaria, but was part of a 
socialistic unification policy in all of the communist regimes of the Balkans. Thus, 
during the Cold War period, immigrants from other Balkan countries also disem-
barked to Turkey. After Bulgaria, the second largest population movement from the 
Balkans was from Yugoslavia, from where 186,925 people migrated to Turkey be-
tween 1945 and 1990 (Kirişci 1995, p. 70). As Yugoslavia did not permit migration 
of the Turkish and Muslim community during the period 1939–1950, it was only 
after the political rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Turkey and the signing of 
the Balkan Pact in the later period that most of these people could take their leave 
(Altuğ 1991, p. 115; Eren 1993, p. 296; Beltan 2006, pp. 25–28). From the 1950s 
to the 1960s, approximately 150,000 immigrants arrived in Turkey composed not 
only of Turks, but also Albanians, Pomaks, and Bosnians (Beltan 2006, pp. 25–28). 
Concerned about their status in post-war communist Yugoslavia, even those Muslim 
Albanians who could not speak Turkish claimed Turkish ancestry in order to use 
this immigration status (Kirişci 1995, p. 71; Poulton 1991, p. 92).
In this sense, Albanians were an interesting case. Until 1948, the Albanians of 
Yugoslavia benefited from the situation created by the good relations between Al-
bania and Yugoslavia. However, as Yugoslavia broke its ties with the USSR and its 
satellites, including Albania, the Albanians of Yugoslavia started to be suspected 
of being manipulated by Albania and aiming to destabilize Yugoslavia (De Rapper 
2000).
Although an Albanian state had emerged from the Ottoman Empire, many Muslim Alba-
nians took advantage of various emigration agreements between Yugoslavia and Turkey, 
and seeing Turkey rather than Albania as their kin-state, moved to there; this could be 
explained largely by Enver Hoxha’s post-war fortress mentality and militant atheism (Poul-
ton 1997, p. 200).
16 Quotation translated by the authors.
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With the 1953 Balkan Pact, many Albanians began to depart for Turkey. There were 
three novel characteristics of this new wave of departures (Poulton 1997, p. 200). 
First, in addition to the political dimension of the previous departures, there was 
a national dimension of these movements. While political opposition was still a 
characteristic of Albanians—anti-communist sentiments among them were wide-
spread—there was also resentment among those people who had passed ‘religion 
before the nation’. Secondly, in order to legally migrate to Turkey in line with the 
Balkan Pact, Albanians pretended to be members of the Turkish minority. Accord-
ing to De Rapper (2000), one third of the people who then declared themselves as 
Turks did not speak Turkish. Thirdly, though 20 years after the previous wave, these 
latter immigrants benefited from the existence of an Albanian community in Turkey 
with family ties, which facilitated their rapid integration.
Following the consolidation of the communist regime in Yugoslavia and an im-
proving minority status, from the 1970s to 1980s migration to Turkey declined no-
ticeably. Only 1797 people—most of whom were joining close relatives—chose to 
migrate to Turkey in this period (Table 5.3; Beltan 2006, pp. 25–28; Kirişci 1995, 
p. 71).
During the years of the Cold War, migration from Greece was the third largest 
demographic movement to Turkey after those from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In the 
course of World War II and the subsequent civil war in Greece, many Muslims from 
Greece were granted asylum in Turkey (Kirişci 1995). It was only after the internal 
situation had returned to normal in 1951 that Turkey ended its policy of admitting 
Muslims from Greece. Subsequently, approximately 26,000 Muslims from Greece 
migrated to Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s (Beltan 2006, pp. 25–28; Kirişci 
1995, pp. 72–73).17
The smallest migration flows during the Cold War years came from Romania, 
with only 1200 immigrants arriving in Turkey. This small number can be explained 
by the fairly liberal cultural and minority rights that the Turkish community enjoyed 
in Romania18 after World War II (Kirişci 1995, p. 74). Accordingly, it would not be 
wrong to argue that while bilateral relations were also important, the levels of mi-
gration from the Balkans during this period were highly correlated with the internal 
17 There are no data available for the war period between 1939 and 1945.
18 To illustrate, Turks have comprised almost 2 % of the population in Northern Dobrudja from the 
1950s until today.
Table 5.3  The Turkish population in the FR Yugoslavia according to official documents. (Source: 
Geray 1962, pp. 10–14)
Area 1948 1953 1961 1971 1981
Kosovo 1315 34,583 25,764 12,244 12,513
Macedonia 95,940 203,908 131,481 108,552 86,691
Yugoslavia 97,255 229,672 157,245 120,796 101,291
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politics of the Balkan countries—especially with their treatment of their minorities. 
The reasons for migration to Turkey in the next period were rather different.
5.4  Current Stage
The end of the Cold War had two main consequences for migration dynamics in the 
Balkans. First, the transition stage from communist totalitarian regimes to capitalist 
democracies generated ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which produced 
certainly the most dramatic forced ethnic migrations on the European continent in 
the last two decades (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004). Secondly, this transition formed 
the political and economic foundations for the extension or emergence of a series 
of migration flows that previously had been strictly controlled by states. Generally, 
it can be argued that while migrations of the previous periods were more ethno-
religious in character, the current movements from the Balkans to Turkey can be 
characterized more as labour migrations19—maybe with the two exceptions of the 
Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars who took refuge in Turkey during the dissolution of 
the former Yugoslavia. Although there are no statistics, in the case of Muslims from 
Greece (i.e., Turks and Pomaks) an important reason for migration to Turkey is also 
for continued education at university level.
Turkey accepted Bosnian Muslims as refugees after the outbreak of hostilities 
and persecutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 where a total of 2819 Bosnian 
refugees were housed in refugee camps located in different cities of Turkey (Kirişci 
1995, pp. 71–72). Between 1992 and 1995, around 20,000 Bosnians were granted 
temporary asylum; many have returned to Bosnia since the adoption of the Day-
ton Peace Agreement (İçduygu and Sert 2009). Similarly, in 1998 and 1999, about 
18,000 Kosovars took shelter in Turkey and benefited from protection from the 
ethnic strife in their homeland, of whom a majority returned with the lessening of 
the conflict in Kosovo (Kirişci 2001).
With the fall of communism, Turkey became a strategic choice of emigration 
destination for Muslim Albanians from Albania, due to the presence of networks, 
existing relations, the lack of entry requirements (most migrants buy a tourist visa 
at the border), and the absence of anti-foreigner and anti-Albanian racism. There 
were two main waves (De Rapper 2000). The first was during the so-called ‘crisis of 
embassies’ in July 1990 in Tirana, when hundreds of people took refuge in foreign 
embassies. The Embassy of Turkey hosted about 30 people who settled in Turkey 
with the help of the authorities, promoting the arrival of others later on the basis of 
kinship networks. These first arrivals were mostly fathers. Once the situation was 
stabilized they brought their families. For a number of them, Turkey became a tran-
sit point for other countries, especially the USA.
19 While ethno-religious elements are still important, non-Muslims from the Balkans are also in-
volved in these current movements.
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The second wave was in 1997 and 1998, during the economic and political crises 
and rising corruption in Albania, when some 6500 families—42,000 people—ar-
rived in Turkey (De Rapper 2000). Rather than the migration of fathers of families 
or young single men seeking employment abroad, this wave was for the purpose of 
taking the family to safety and ensuring normal living conditions.
Much of the recent migration flows from the Balkans to Turkey are a result of 
economic difficulties in the home countries. These movements are usually of ir-
regular labour migrants, most of whom are from Bulgaria and Romania and arrive 
in Turkey on tourist visas to work informally as domestic labourers, sex workers, 
construction workers, or sweatshop workers (İçduygu and Yükseker 2008). Many 
of these migrants come to Turkey legally, in line with Turkish visa requirements, but 
overstay their visas and then become illegal while in the country (İçduygu 2009). 
Thus, while many economic sectors in western Turkey—mainly the textile, con-
struction, sex, and entertainment industries—hinge on this type of cheap labour, 
upper and middle-class Turkish families provide work for female domestic helpers 
as nannies, babysitters, or carers for the sick and elderly (İçduygu and Yükseker 
2008). These people’s working conditions are precarious, with long hours and low 
wages—without social security, health insurance, or pension schemes.
The case of Romanian migration to Turkey is illustrative in showing that these 
countries are now part of a migration system in which economic conditions, not 
only in these countries themselves, but in the entire region, affect patterns of move-
ment. For example, the first wave of Romanian migration took place from 1990 to 
1995. During this period a new pattern of mass migration of Romanian-speaking 
Christian Romanians to the Turkish labour market emerged which was quintessen-
tially transnational—that is, ‘they worked in the host countries for fixed periods of 
time, stipulated in their work contracts, and were not joined by their families’ (Ban 
2009, p. 5). At that time, Turkey was a major destination for traders and informal 
service workers; once migration networks for the Italian, Spanish, and Greek labour 
markets started to consolidate in the second half of the 1990s, and economic oppor-
tunities shortly became modest for the prospective migrant in Turkey, the number of 
Romanian migrants in Turkey decreased substantially (Ban 2009, p. 5).
At the same time, it is possible to speak of a return migration to the Balkans from 
Turkey. With the regime change in Bulgaria in 1990, one third of the refugees who 
had arrived in the previous period returned, while the rest remained and acquired 
Turkish citizenship. Based on the figures provided for 2006 by the Bureau for For-
eigners, Borders, and Asylum of the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry 
of Interior, Bulgarians still constitute the largest nationality with residence permits 
in Turkey (İçduygu and Sert 2009). However, following Bulgaria’s recent accession 
to the EU, an increasing number of these Turks of Bulgarian origin have again ap-
plied for Bulgarian citizenship so as to obtain the right to travel to Bulgaria and to 
other EU countries without a visa.
Data confirm the decreasing scale of immigration from the Balkans to Turkey. 
Based on 31 December 2012 population and housing census data provided by the 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), around 1.3 % of Turkey’s population were born 
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abroad. While around 43 % of this group were born in Bulgaria, approximately 
8.7 % and 3.5 % were born in Macedonia and Greece, respectively. Bulgaria remains 
a part of migration trends towards Turkey, albeit of lesser importance. Compared to 
the 1980s, when Bulgarian migrants were the second largest group of immigrants in 
Turkey, they currently form around only 2 % of the migrant stock.
Figures provided by the Ministry of Interior also show a declining trend of im-
migration from Bulgaria and the Balkans in general. Until 2008, around 30 % of 
immigration in Turkey was from this region; subsequently, the proportion decreased 
to 12 %. One explanation for this decline is the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
two important migrant-sending countries, to the EU—leaving Turkey as a less at-
tractive destination compared with the new opportunities in the EU (Sert and Kor-
fali). Although there was a small upwards trend in 2010, to 16 % right after the euro-
zone crisis, it fell back to 10 % in 2012. Looking at these numbers, one might claim 
that immigration from the Balkans to Turkey has taken a more rational volume and 
that migrants seem to be making their decisions based on economic interests rather 
than ethnic kinship ties.
5.5  Conclusion
Looking at the migration patterns from the Balkans into Turkey through a longi-
tudinal analysis, we can apply Parla’s claim for the Bulgarian case to the entire 
Balkans and argue that Turkey’s attitudes towards these migrations ranged from 
reluctant acceptance or welcoming its ‘racial kin’ to indifference towards irregular 
migrants, depending on the political and economic environment. The late Ottoman 
period can be characterized as ‘reluctant acceptance’ of immigrants, as settlement 
and management of these people constituted an important problem for the Empire 
in its decline. Then, the early years of the Republic are a typical example of the 
‘welcoming’ attitude towards the ‘racial kin’ from the Balkans. This was in line with 
the founding fathers’ desire to increase the population of the war-torn and epidemic-
rife Anatolia. The years of the Cold War were a direct reflection of the political and 
economic climate. In this period we observe many fluctuations in migration flows, 
which are largely ethnic in character, depending on the home countries’ treatment 
of minorities. The current stage of Balkan migrations to Turkey is rather different—
with less importance of ethnic kin, more significance of economic conditions, more 
two-way flows, and indifference on the part of the authorities towards the situation 
of irregular labour migrants. All in all, Balkan migrant flows to Turkey represent 
a lively migration system that has adapted to changing local, bilateral, and global 
conditions over time.
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